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A PROPOSAL: CODIFICATION BY STATUTE OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS
Charles W. Pickering, Sr.*
Bradley S. Clanton-
INTRODUCTION
There are few issues in modem day politics upon which there is little to no dis-
agreement among members of Congress, political commentators, the media, and the
public at large. One such issue relates to the confirmation of judges to the federal
judiciary: the process of confirming judges in the United States Senate is broken and
should be reformed.'
The flaws in the current system are varied, but each is ultimately linked to oppo-
sition to the judicial philosophy of the President's nominees. Because the Senate
confirmation process is based on inconsistently-applied traditions and precedents
rather than fixed procedural rules, a small minority of ideologically-driven senators
have engaged in the unprecedented use of senatorial traditions, including the filibuster,
to prevent up or down votes on judicial nominees - even those that enjoy the support
of a majority of the Senate - leaving nominees sometimes languishing for years.
* Senior Counsel, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Jackson,
Mississippi. Judge Pickering retired from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
December 2004, where he served under a recess appointment from President George W.
Bush. Judge Pickering served as U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Mississippi
from 1990 until January 2004 when he was appointed to the Fifth Circuit. He received his
law degree from the University of Mississippi School of Law, where he graduated first in his
law school class. For some thirty years prior to going on the federal bench, Judge Pickering
was engaged in the active practice of law and in political, civic, community, and religious
activities in Mississippi. The views expressed herein are those of the authors alone and do
not represent the views of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C.
* Of Counsel, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Jackson,
Mississippi and Washington, D.C. Before joining Baker Donelson, Mr. Clanton served as
Chief Counsel to the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution.
Prior to that, Mr. Clanton practiced law in Washington, D.C. after serving as a law clerk to
the Honorable Judge David A. Nelson, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Mr.
Clanton received his juris doctorate in 1996 with special distinction from the Mississippi
College School of Law, and his B.A. cum laude from the University of Mississippi in 1992.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors alone and do not represent the views of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C.
' See generally John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need
for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181 (2003).
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Some senators, at the behest of partisan interest groups, distort and misrepresent the
legal and political philosophies of nominees. Nominees to the federal bench face
withering (and unwarranted) public attacks on their character and integrity. The
same partisan interest groups spend millions of dollars on attack ads and investi-
gations combing through nominees' lives in search of anything that might be used
to discredit, attack, or defeat them.
As a result of this flawed process, vacancies on an already overburdened federal
judiciary remain unfilled; political hostility within the Senate and between the President
and Senate has reached a boiling point; nominees' lives and careers are left in limbo
for months and years; the personal toll of sustained personal attacks often over-
whelms both the nominees and their families; many nominees simply give up and
withdraw, and other well-qualified prospective nominees simply decline to submit
to such a degrading process.2 Unless steps are taken to correct the defects in the
current system, the quality, integrity, independence, and diversity of the judiciary will
be severely compromised. As described by one commentator, "[p]ast ideological
scrutiny by senators of both parties has embittered many nominees, threatened judicial
independence, discouraged individuals from enduring the confirmation process, and
contributed to the vacancy crisis in the federal judiciary."3 In addition, "the boundary
between law and politics has eroded substantially," and "[p]olitical necessity, not
principled evaluation, is the currency in the confirmation process."4
There is little reason to believe the political battle over judicial nominations will
decrease in the foreseeable future. Yet, the implementation of procedural changes may
expedite the confirmation process and reduce the potential harm to the quality, integrity,
independence, and diversity of the judiciary. Some propose reforming the filibuster
rules in the Senate to prohibit the filibuster of judicial nominees.5 Such a proposal
is fine as far as it goes, and it should be implemented if there is another filibuster of
ajudicial nominee. However, there are numerous other defects in the confirmation
process unrelated to the filibuster, and a change to the filibuster rule can easily be
reversed in the future when someone else's ox is being gored.
2 See generally E. Martin Enriquez, Comment, Tyranny ofthe Minority: The Unconsti-
tutional Filibuster and the Superimposed Supermajority on the Advice and Consent Clause
of the Constitution, 21 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 215 (2004). During the first two years of
President George W. Bush's Administration, the confirmation rate for judges was only 55
percent. Id. at 237. By contrast, during the first two years of the Reagan Administration, the
rate was of confirmation was 98 percent, while President George H.W. Bush's rate for the
first two years was 93 percent, and President Clinton's was 90 percent. Id.
' Michael M. Gallagher, Disarming the Confirmation Process, 50 CLEv. ST. L. REV.
513, 516-17 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
4 Id. at 517.
' See generally Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change
Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205 (2004).
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A more comprehensive and long-term procedural reform to the confirmation
process would be a statute codifying the procedures for the confirmation of federal
judges.6 The specific contours of a statutory confirmation process are obviously up
to Congress to create. However, such a statute should, in our view, include specified
time periods within which a nominee would receive a hearing before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, a vote in Committee, and a debate and a vote on the Senate
floor. The statute should also include procedures to extend the deadlines in extraor-
dinary circumstances for reasonable but limited periods of time.
A statutory solution will provide a number of benefits to the confirmation process.
First, statutory procedures will provide much more stability and predictability in the
confirmation process, ensuring all Presidents - regardless of party affiliation -
that their nominees will be treated the same as nominees of the other party. Second,
statutory procedures will provide senators and prospective nominees with clear and
predictable rules for the confirmation process. Nominees will know that, regardless
of which party is in control of the Senate, within a specified time period they will
be either confirmed or rejected. In any event, the nominees will be allowed to move
on with their lives. Third, codifying the rules for the confirmation process will stop
the endless cycle of retaliation in the Senate when control of the Senate changes
hands or when different parties control the Senate and the Presidency. Statutory pro-
cedures will provide both parties with a fresh start in confirming judges, leaving
behind actual or perceived mistreatment of past nominees.7 We harbor no illusion
that codifying the procedures for confirmation of judges will cure all the ills caused
by the politicization of the judicial selection process. However, it will at least bring
some stability, predictability, and order to what has become an almost chaotic and
intolerable process.
I. THE CONFIRMATION MESS: How WE GOT HERE
A. The Rise of Ideological Scrutiny of Judicial Nominees.
For much of our nation's history, "judges nominated by the President were con-
firmed based on their experience, qualifications, and integrity, rather than on their
political stance and ideology.",8 This practice was consistent with the view of the
6 There are numerous precedents for statutory codification of the procedures for
consideration of certain matters in Congress. See notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
7 In addition, an open debate on the appropriate procedures for handling judicial nomi-
nations will be beneficial to the judiciary, the Senate, and the country as a whole.
8 Gerald Walpin, Take Obstructionism Out of the Judicial Nominations Confirmation
Process, 8 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 89, 90 (2003). See also Gallagher, supra note 3, at 522-23.
Many commentators argue that the history of the appointments
clause proves that the Senate should not utilize ideology as a criterion
in evaluating a nominee. Significant historical evidence supports this
2006]
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Framers, who generally saw the Senate's role in the confirmation process as limited
to the prevention of "the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from
family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity."9 There
is scant support in the debates over the Constitution "about the need for a Senate
check on the president's power to appoint judges on the grounds of ideological con-
cern's. ' During the last half of the twentieth century, however, the ascendancy of
the notion of the "Living Constitution" shifted the resolution of many of the most
important issues of the day from the legislative and executive branches of the govern-
ment to the judiciary. The most widely-recognized example of this shift was the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade," declaring state laws prohibiting abortion
unconstitutional. 2 Since Roe was decided, "the confirmation process has trans-
formed into a sustained ideological battle that now extends to lower court judges,
even though they are powerless to overturn that controversial decision."'13 Another
example is Engel v. Vitale, 4 which "declared that the daily recitation of a voluntary
twenty-two-word, non-denominational prayer in New York's public schools violated
the Establishment Clause, notwithstanding the fact that the Congress that had authored
the First Amendment had itself begun its days with prayer." 5 The Court's holding
in Engel "ended a practice that had been part of the American experience since the
conclusion. The grounds for rejecting a nominee, such as political favor-
itism by the President, or ethical lapses by the nominee, are especially
compelling. Notably, the great majority of historical evidence does not
mention ideology as a criterion.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
I THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 386 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Books 1982). As
Madison wrote in Federalist 51, "The primary consideration [for confirmation of judges]
ought to be... qualifications." The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), supra, at 262. See
also John S. Baker, Jr., Ideology and the Confirmation of Federal Judges, 43 S. TEX. L. REV.
177, 187 (2001) ('The advice and consent prerogative of the Senate has been designed to
prevent (although historically it has not always prevented) the President from appointing
'political hacks' (political appointees who lack competence and/or character).").
10 Christopher Wolfe, The Senate's Power to Give "Advice and Consent" in Judicial
Appointments, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 355, 357 (1999). The limited role of the Senate was noted
by historian Joseph Harris, who wrote that "[t]he debates of the Convention indicate that
'advice and consent' was regarded as simply to vote of approval or rejection. The phrase was
used as synonymous with 'approbation,' 'concurrence,' and 'approval,' and the power of
the Senate was spoken of as a 'negative' on the appointment by the President." JOSEPH P.
HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE CONFIRMATION OF
APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE 376 (Greenwood Press 1968) (1953).
'" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12 id.
13 See Baker, supra note 9, at 186.
14 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
" James L. Buckley, Essay, The Constitution and the Courts: A Question of Legitimacy,
24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 194-95 (2000).
[Vol. 14:807
CODIFICATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS
outset of public education and that an overwhelming majority of American parents
wished to have continued.'
' 6
As a result of this politicization of the judiciary, "judicial appointments to lower
federal courts as well as the Supreme Court 'are now one of the principal ideological
battlegrounds of American politics.""..7 As described by Professor John Eastman:
The reason that some Senators are so intent on delving into
the judicial philosophy of nominees is deeply connected to their
view of the proper role of the judiciary in American government.
Viewing the Constitution as a "living document," modem-day
liberals see the Court as a place where the Constitution is stretched,
shaped, cut, and rewritten in order to put in place so-called "pro-
gressive" policies that could never emerge from the legislative
process.8
Most agree that President Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1987 was "a turning point in the nomination process and a triumph
for unrestrained politicization of the judicial confirmation process."' 9 Following
Judge Bork's defeat, the confirmation process steadily spiraled downward. Republi-
cans, angry over the mistreatment of Judge Bork, vowed revenge. 20 That anger only
increased after the bitter confirmation battle over Justice Clarence Thomas in 1991.21
When the Republicans gained control of the Senate in 1994, it was time for that vow
of revenge to be fulfilled.2 Many of President Clinton's nominees were placed on
hold, others never appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee, some waited years
before receiving a hearing, and others never had a hearing at all.23 Like the Republicans
16 Id. at 195.
17 Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replacing "Despise
andResent" with "Advice and Consent", 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2001) (quoting G. CALVIN
MACKENZIE, STARTING OVER: THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS IN 1997, at 11
(1998).
18 John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of the Senate's Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 633,652 (2003); see also id. ("The Senate's expanded use of its confirmation
power should perhaps come as no surprise. As a result of the growing role of the judiciary,
the Senate's part in the nomination process has become a powerful political tool.").
'9 Walpin, supra note 8, at 95. See also Gallagher, supra note 3, at 523 ('The Senate's
consideration of a nominee's ideology finds its historical roots not in 1787, but in 1987, the
year of the Bork nomination.").
20 Gallagher, supra note 3, at 526.
21 id.
22 id.
23 Id. at 527.
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following the defeat of Judge Bork's nomination, the Democrats became increasingly
embittered by the confirmation process.24
With President George W. Bush's election, it was payback time for the Democrats.25
In addition to the lingering bitterness over the perceived mistreatment of President
Clinton's nominees, Democrats were furious over the Supreme Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore,6 which they perceived as nothing more than an ideologically-driven
decision in favor of President Bush.27 Republicans, by contrast, saw the Court's actions
in Bush v. Gore as merely upholding the Constitution in the face of a lawless Florida
Supreme Court. As a result of this conflict, Democrats promised severe scrutiny,
obstruction, and opposition to President Bush's nominees, and some liberal commen-
tators even urged that none of Bush's nominees receive a hearing.28 Democrats have
so far fulfilled their promise by engaging in the unprecedented use of the filibuster to
block votes on ten of President Bush's nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals29 and
by "threaten[ing] filibusters o[f] six more. '30 Other nominees were blocked when
Democrats controlled the Judiciary Committee and voted in lock step to prevent the
nominees from moving forward to a vote by the full Senate.
B. The Current "Procedures" for Confirmation of Judicial Nominees in the
Senate
The judicial confirmation process in the Senate is not codified in Senate rules, but
instead consists primarily of a hodgepodge of traditions and precedents that empower
a small group of senators, or even an individual senator, to delay interminably the
confirmation of judicial nominees. One of the oldest of these precedents is known
as "senatorial courtesy," which allows a senator from the home state of a nominee
24 Id.
25 Id. at 529.
26 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
27 Gallagher, supra note 3, at 529.
28 Id.
29 See Wendy E. Long, Filibuster Myth-Busters: How Senate Democrats Mask Obstruction,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005, at A23.
30 151 CONG. REc. S5859, 5859 (daily ed. May 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Majority
Leader Frist) [hereinafter Frist]. One of the authors of this paper, Charles W. Pickering, Sr.,
was a judicial nominee who was filibustered during the 108th Congress. Despite having been
rated "Well-qualified" by the American Bar Association, having been unanimously con-
firmed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi in October
of 1990, and having the support of the majority of the Senate, the Senate Democrats chose
to filibuster Judge Pickering's promotion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The President placed Judge Pickering on the Fifth Circuit by recess appointment on January
16, 2004, but at the expiration of that recess appointment on December 8, 2004, Judge
Pickering retired from the bench.
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to block a nomination to an office in that state.3' Although senatorial courtesy has
generally been granted to senators of the president's party, senators from the minor-
ity party have also successfully blocked nominations on numerous occasions.32
Similar to senatorial courtesy, the "blue slip" is a tradition whereby the chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee sends a blue slip to a judicial nominee's home
state senators seeking their position on the nominee.33 Whether or not a home state
senator's disapproval kills the nomination has depended upon the chairman of the
Judiciary Committee at the time.' For example, Senator James 0. Eastland (D-Miss.),
Judiciary Chairman from 1956 to 1978, would not allow a nomination to proceed
without approval from both home state senators.35 Other chairmen gave negative
blue slips strong consideration but did not always allow a negative blue slip to defeat
a nomination."
A third device used by senators to delay or block judicial nominees is the "hold,"
which allows an individual senator to "hold" indefinitely and prevent consideration of
a nominee for any reason at all.37 The hold is "a little-known, but apparently venerable,
custom in the Senate, [that] has lately evolved into a formidable weapon for minority
control, enabling any senator to prevent consideration of any matter, including nomi-
nations."3 The hold's origins are uncertain, but "it has been suggested that the custom
evolved to aid senators who had to be absent from debate on a particular matter, and did
not want the matter resolved in their absence. '39 However, "[tihe custom has evolved,
... and now senators regularly use holds to express personal opposition to a partic-
ular nominee, or as leverage with the Administration on another, usually unrelated,
matter."40
Although historically not used to block judicial nominees, the "filibuster" recently
became the tool of choice of Democratic senators seeking to prevent confirmation
31 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OFTHE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE
740 (1938).
32 See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE
CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE 224 (1953).
33 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 147 (2000).
34 See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 12 n.j. (1997).
31 See id.
36 Brannon P. Denning, The Judicial Confirmation Process and the Blue Slip, 85
JUDICATURE 218, 220 (2002).
" Walpin, supra note 8, at 105.
38 Denning, supra note 17, at 20 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
39 Id. at 20-21; see also Walpin, supra note 8, at 105 (noting that the hold "evolved from
the Senate custom of allowing senators to postpone consideration from debate of a specific
matter in their absence").
4 Denning, supra note 17, at 21.
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of President Bush's appointees to the federal bench.4' The filibuster "allows one or
more Senators from the minority party to hold a nomination hostage, thereby
preventing a vote, unless sixty Senators vote to end debate by invoking cloture."'42
Sometimes "[c]onsidered Congress's most famous procedural tool, the filibuster has
a lengthy history. However, one should not be proud of its heritage. It was utilized
for nearly a century to defend Jim Crow laws and to prevent the enactment of civil-
rights legislation. 43 Indeed, the Senate recently passed a resolution apologizing for
failing to enact anti-lynching laws during the Jim Crow era, a failure directly caused
by the use of the filibuster.'
The term "filibuster" has its origins in the Dutch word "vrijbuiter," which means
"looters and robbers." 4
5
Vrijbuiter was then adopted by the English and anglicized into
freebooter - meaning pirates. Lastly, it was adopted and trans-
lated into Spanish -filibusteros. The Spaniards used this word
to describe pirates who looted the Spanish West Indies in the
seventeenth century. Similarly, the Americans adopted the word
in the mid-nineteenth century to refer to men who looted across
Central America - including William Walker, who in the 1850s
tried to incite a revolution in Nicaragua. Finally, the term was
applied to "legislative minorities who used what the majority
deemed piratical, disorderly, [and] lawless methods" of obstruct-
ing business in the Senate.'
For over two hundred years of American history, the filibuster was not used to
block confirmation of judicial nominees with majority support.47 As noted above,
"' See Walpin, supra note 8, at 90.
42 Id. at 98.
4' Enriquez, supra note 2, at 215 (footnotes omitted).
" See S. Res. 39, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. S6347, 6364-65 (daily ed. June 13,
2005); id. at 6372 (statement of Sen. Allen) ("Three [anti-lynching] bills passed the House
of Representatives, but were filibustered on the Senate floor.").
's Enriquez, supra note 2, at 224.
I d. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting ROBERT LUCE,
LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES AND THE COURSE OF BusINESs IN
THE FRAMING OF STATUTES 283 (1922)).
4' The impropriety of filibustering judicial nominees was "well-stated in 1968 by a
non-partisan coalition which called itself the 'Lawyers' Committee on Supreme Court
Nominations,"' which was comprised of the "deans of most major law schools and... [the]
past president[s] of the American Bar Association." Walpin, supra note 8, at 98. The
Committee wrote:
If ... nominations do not win the support of a majority of the Senate,
they will fail. If they do win such support, they deserve the Senate's
[Vol. 14:807
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this historical practice changed dramatically during the 108th Congress in 2003 and
2004, when Democrats filibustered ten of President Bush's nominees to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals and threatened filibusters of six more." During that Congress,
only eighteen of President Bush's thirty-four nominees to the courts of appeals were
confirmed.49 Sixteen nominees to the courts of appeals - an astounding 47 percent -
failed to be confirmed by the Senate.50 As described by Professor Stephen Calabresi:
[F]or the first time in 214 years of American history a minority of
senators is seeking to extend the tradition of filibustering from leg-
islation to judicial nominees who [the minority of senators] know
enjoy the support of a majority of the Senate. This is a change of
constitutional dimensions and amounts to a kind of coup d'etat.'
consent. Nothing would more poorly serve our constitutional system
than for the nominations to have earned the approval of the Senate
majority but to be thwarted because the majority is denied a chance to
vote.
Id. at 98-99 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
48 See discussion supra note 30 and accompanying text. The nomination of Miguel
Estrada to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was filibustered seven times. See
Frist, supra note 30 at 5860. Mr. Estrada, who has one of the brightest legal minds in
America, eventually withdrew himself from consideration for the D.C. Circuit. Office of
Legal Pol'y, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nominations, http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/judicial
nominations 108.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Nominations]. During that same
period, the nomination of Judge Priscilla Owen to the Fifth Circuit was filibustered for four
years. See Frist, supra note 30, at 5860. When Senate Minority Whip Harry Reid was asked
how many hours were necessary to debate the nomination of Judge Owen, he responded:
"[T]here is not a number in the universe that would be sufficient." 149 CONG. REC. S4919,
4949 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Reid).
4' Nominations, supra note 48.
o See id.
5' Steven G. Calabresi, Pirates We Be, WAILST. J., May 14,2003, at A14. Some Democrats
cite the 1968 nomination of Justice Abe Fortas to the position of Chief Justice as precedent
for their use of the filibuster to block President Bush's judicial nominees. See Long, supra
note 29. However, the historical record does not support the claim that Justice Fortas's
nomination was filibustered. See Comyn, supra note 1, at 220. In fact, Justice Fortas's nomi-
nation failed because it could not obtain "the support of fifty-one Senators ... due to
allegations of ethical improprieties and the bipartisan opposition of twenty-four Republicans
and nineteen Democrats." Id. (footnotes omitted). When a cloture vote was sought on the
Fortas nomination, Fortas had the support of only forty-five senators. President Johnson
subsequently withdrew the nomination, and Justice Fortas eventually resigned from the
Supreme Court under the threat of impeachment. See id. at 222. Moreover, whether or not
the Fortas nomination is accurately characterized as a "filibuster," it was clearly inconsistent
with almost two hundred years of Senate precedent. And it provides no support for the use
of the filibuster by Senate Democrats to block votes on President Bush's nominees, who
enjoy the support of a majority of the Senate. Nor do President Clinton's nominations of
2006]
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After Majority Leader Bill Frist threatened to use what has been described as
"the constitutional option"52 to amend Senate rules to bar the filibuster of judicial
nominees, an agreement was reached by a "gang of fourteen" senators (seven from each
party), who agreed to allow certain nominees to move forward and to vote against
filibusters in the future absent "extraordinary circumstances."53 As this discussion
clearly illustrates, the judicial confirmation process is badly broken and should be
reformed.
II. STATUTORY PROPOSAL FOR THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS.
We believe that the Constitution authorizes Congress to statutorily codify the
procedures for confirming federal judges, and that Congress should exercise that
authority. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the President "shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint...
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law. ' 4 Although this provision obviously requires that nominees to the U.S.
Supreme Court be confirmed by the Senate, it does not specify exactly how the
Senate is to carry out that responsibility.5 And, while the Constitution gives the Senate
and the House the authority to adopt rules to govem proceedings in each body,56 we
believe there is no constitutional impediment to the Senate choosing to adopt such a
rule by statute.
Richard Paez and Marsha Berzon to the Ninth Circuit provide support for Democrat fili-
busters. When a small number of senators sought to filibuster Paez and Berzon, then-Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott joined Minority Leader Tom Dashle to oppose the filibuster, with
twenty Republican senators who actually opposed the nominees joining with Democrats to
invoke cloture by votes of 85-14 and 86-13, respectively. See 146 CONG. REC. S1247,
1301-1302 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2000). Both Paez and Berzon are on the federal bench today.
52 See generally Gold & Gupta, supra note 5.
13 See Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, A Last-Minute Deal on Judicial Nominees,
WASH. POST, May 24, 2005, at Al.
14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
15 See Gallagher, supra note 3, at 520 ("Unfortunately, the Constitution says little about
the precise contours of 'advice and consent."').
56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
" There is some dispute among legal scholars regarding whether the Rules of Proceedings
Clause bars Congress from statutorily codifying rules governing legislative proceedings. See
generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment,
Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. &POL. 345,384-93 (2003).
Some argue that the provision is not exclusive and that Congress may adopt rules either
unilaterally in each house or through bicameral approval and presentment to the President.
See id. at 388. Others argue that the provision is exclusive and that any statutorily-created
rule that cannot be amended without the participation of the other body and the president
violates the Constitution. See id. at 389. We believe the former is the better interpretation of
[Vol. 14:807
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Unlike the Supreme Court, the federal district courts and courts of appeals were
created by Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, which vests
the judicial power "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish."58 Because Article I, Section 2 autho-
rizes Congress to vest the appointment of "inferior Officers... in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments," 59 judges appointed by the
President to those courts could, theoretically, be authorized by Congress to be ap-
pointed without Senate confirmation.' However, because lower federal courtjudges
are given lifetime appointments, it is certainly wise policy to allow the Senate to
exercise advice and consent with respect to those appointments. 6' Yet, if Congress
has the authority to create the lower federal courts and to vest the appointment of its
judges solely in the President, it follows that Congress has the authority - if it
chooses to provide for Senate confirmation - to specify the procedures whereby the
Senate is to confirm (or not confirm) nominees to those judgeships.
There are numerous instances where Congress has enacted legislation estab-
lishing statutory rules to determine how it will deal with specific types of legis-
lative responsibilities.62 In the specific context of the judicial confirmation process,
the provision, given its permissive language. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, .2 ("Each House
may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.... ."); cf. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove,
Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REv. 799 (1995) (arguing for a similarly non-
exclusive interpretation of the Treaty Clause).
58 U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. See 28 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2000) ("There shall be in each judicial
district a district court which shall be a court of record known as the United States District
Court for the district."); 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2000) ("There shall be in each circuit a court of
appeals, which shall be a court of record, known as the United States Court of Appeals for
the circuit.").
'9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
60 See Eastman, supra note 18, at 634.
61 See 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2000) ('The President shall appoint, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, district judges for the several judicial districts .... "); 28 U.S.C.
§ 44(a) (2000) ("The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, circuit judges for the several circuits ....").
62 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 631-45a (2000) (congressional budget process); 2 U.S.C. §§ 658d-
658e (2000) (legislation containing unfunded mandates); 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2000) (legislation
that nullifies agency regulations); 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-12 (2000) (executive reorganization
plans); 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h) (2000) (Senate rules for legislation adjusting the status of certain
aliens); 15 U.S.C. § 719f (2000) (procedures for approving presidential determinations
concerning Alaskan natural gas pipelines); 16 U.S.C. § 1823 (2000) (procedures for dis-
approving international fisheries agreements); 29 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2000) (procedures for
considering Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation premium revisions); 42 U.S.C. § 2210(i)
(2000) (procedures for nuclear accident compensation legislation); 42 U.S.C. § 6249c (2000)
(legislation implementing certain petroleum contracts); 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (2000) (procedures
for terminating presidentially declared states of emergency); Amtrak Reform and Account-
ability Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-134, § 205, 111 Stat. 2570, 2582 (1997) (Senate pro-
cedures for considering Amtrak restructuring and liquidation plans); Foreign Operations,
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legislation regulating the process has been introduced (albeit unsuccessfully) numer-
ous times in the past. In 1998, for example, Senator Richard Durbin offered an
amendment to S. 2176 which provided that after any nomination had been pending
for 150 days, the nominee would be deemed discharged from the committee and
reported favorably to the Senate.63 Senator Durbin also proposed an amendment
requiring a vote in the Senate within five calendar days following the 150th day the
nomination was pending.64 During that same Congress, Senator Leahy introduced
S. 1906, the Judicial Emergency Responsibility Act of 1998.65 That legislation
would have prohibited the Senate from recessing during any session for more than
nine days when a judicial nomination had been pending for more than sixty days in
a circuit in which a judicial emergency had been declared.66
In 1991, Senators Bob Graham and Connie Mack introduced S. 9 10, the Judicial
Nomination and Confirmation Reform Act. 67 That legislation required that the Senate
Judiciary Committee review and report on a judicial nominee no later than ninety
days after receiving the nomination.68 If the Committee failed to meet that ninety-day
deadline, the nomination would be automatically discharged from committee without
recommendation for a full vote in the Senate.69 The legislation further required a full
Senate vote within thirty days after the nomination was discharged from committee.7 °
Our statutory proposal is similar to those offered by Senators Durbin, Graham,
and Mack. In particular, we recommend legislation to accomplish the following:
First, any Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on ajudicial nominee should be held
within 120 days after the President submits the name to the Senate. Second, within
thirty days of any such hearings (no more than 150 days after the nomination was
received), a nominee should be reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, with
a favorable recommendation, unfavorable recommendation, or no recommendation
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 518A,
110 Stat. 3009-121-3009-145 (1996) (procedures for approving presidential findings regard-
ing population planning funding); Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and
Realignment Act, Pub. L. No. 100-526, § 208, 102 Stat. 2623, 2632-33 (1988) (procedures
for considering recommendations to close military bases); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7323, 102 Stat. 4181,4467 (1988) (Senate procedures for habeas corpus
reform legislation).
63 See S. Amend. No. 3658, amending S. 2176, 144 CONG. REC. S10945, 10997 (daily
ed. Sept. 25, 1998).
6' See S. Amend. No. 3659, amending S. 2176, 144 CONG. REc. S10945, 10997.
65 S. 1906, 105th Cong. (1998); see also 144 CONG. REC. S3023, 3122 (daily ed. Apr. 2,
1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
6 S. 1906
67 S. 910, 102d Cong. (1991); see also 137 CONG. REc. 9075,9138-40 (1991) (statements
of Sen. Graham).
61 S. 9102(a) (proposing addition of 28 U.S.C. § 493(a)(1)).
69 Id. (proposing addition of 28 U.S.C. § 493(a)(2)).
70 Id. (proposing addition of 28 U.S.C. § 493(b)).
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at all. If the Senate Judiciary Committee fails to report the nominee, the nominee
should be automatically discharged from Committee without recommendation. Third,
within sixty days after a nominee is reported out of Committee (no more than 210 days
after the nomination was received), the nominee should receive an up or down vote
before the full Senate. And, finally, any judicial nominee receiving majority support
should be confirmed.
We recognize that this proposal, if adopted, will diminish the power of an indi-
vidual senator or a minority of senators to block judicial nominees. However, as noted
above, a major problem in the current confirmation system is that there are no clearly-
defined and binding procedures to control the process. Consequently, traditions and
precedents have been abused. The present conflict over the confirmation of judges not
only threatens the quality, integrity, independence, and diversity of the federal judi-
ciary, it also undermines the collegiality of the Senate and threatens the ability of
the Senate to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. A problem of this magnitude
demands a solution and justifies some concession of power.
We also recognize that some conservative commentators and Republican officials
have cautioned against reforming the confirmation process, as Republicans may one
day find themselves in the position of the Democrats today, seeking to block a Senate
vote on the judicial nominees of a Democratic president. While we understand the
political expediency of this argument, we believe it is inconsistent with the structure
created by the Constitution for the selection of federal judges. The Constitution vests
the selection of judges in the President, subject to the advice and consent of the
Senate.71 As historically understood, the Senate's advice and consent role is limited
to questions of qualification for office, judicial temperament, and integrity. Like it or
not, it is the President's constitutional prerogative - regardless of party - to nominate
judges, and judicial nominees should be confirmed by the Senate if they meet the
requisite qualifications. In addition, the Constitution provides for confirmation by a
majority vote, not a super-majority. 72 In our view, the Constitution should be inter-
preted as written, regardless of whether we favor the outcome as a matter of public
policy.
As long as the "Living Constitution" is part of the judicial landscape, we will con-
tinue to have battles over judicial confirmations. However, we believe our statutory
proposal will at least cure some of the procedural problems and reduce retaliation.
Such a statute will provide consistency, continuity, and stability to the confirmation
process. Any solution to the confirmation battle must be fair and reasonable to both
sides, and both sides must have meaningful input in the process. We believe our
recommendations meet these criteria.
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
72 Id.
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